A Scientist's Response to Intel Re ATSDR Report

After a somewhat quick and dirty review of the first 14 pages of the Intel response letter, I offer the following talking points for you to consider.

The first and major comment is that most of the Intel letter is at odds with the factual evidence, including FTIR measurements made on their property by their own contractor during an especially low-production period.

We hope ATSDR will base the content of their final report on facts, rather than who can afford the best PR department.

Intel's slick letter, filled with false and misleading information, is typical of the how the deck has consistently been stacked against the public by Intel and the politicians who benefit from Intel's wealth.

ATSDR may not want specific points, and you may not be able to bring up the points without seeming to read. But you could always say you have extensive notes you'll be referring to.

2nd paragraph on page 2: Intel taking credit for involving the community must mean the Community Environmental Working Group. Intel established this group, chose the members, the leader, and facilitator, and controls the agendas. This is and always has been part of Intel's PR effort to project a favorable image.

Later in that same paragraph, they claim "periodic measurements of emissions to verify that plant emissions are within specified limits" They neglect to say that they report only calculated emissions, using unverified emission factors as multipliers. And that their permit, called a sham and a farce by Jim Shively, NMED's permit expert, was written to be "bust-proof and unenforceable."

Two other former NMED employees went on record supporting Mr. Shively, in published interviews. And another 16 NMED retirees expressed their willingness to do likewise. Robert Samaniego, then the NMED Permit Compliance Officer, admitted in a published interview that the reason it took five years to approve Intel's minor-source permit was because a large majority of NMED professionals opposed it. Their professional concerns were over-ridden when the governor ordered his political appointee, who headed NMED, to approve whatever Intel wanted.

The fact that Intel complies with a "bust-proof" permit proves nothing. It's like bragging about not getting a speeding ticket when driving on an Autobahn that has no speed limit. We have often said, and they have never denied, Intel could release more than 5 tons of phosgene in an hour or less, killing tens of thousands of people and animals, without violating their sham permit. And Intel's permit allows them to release ton quantities of other chemicals that are even more toxic.

Three Intel whistle-blowers have also gone on record in published interviews to say Intel knew it was releasing hazardous levels of toxic chemicals, but made a deliberate effort to cover up that information. The whistle-blowers lost their jobs when they refused to be part of that cover up.

First new paragraph on page 3: Intel takes more credit for their fully-controlled CEWG, which I've already covered.

Near the end of page 3: Although Radian was hired by Intel, and wanted to please their customer, the Radian risk assessment expressed concern about the downwash of Intel emissions into nearby residential areas. The Radian report also said Intel stacks were too low.

The downwash problem continues unabated. And recently, Intel ignored the recommendation of its own CEWG to raise their stacks to a level that would significantly decrease their toxic chemicals that get into the breathing zone of nearby residential areas. Instead, Intel chose only a small height increase to prevent their stacks from being visible from Highway 528, to promote the fictional image of being a safe industry.

The modeling analysis mentioned in the last line on page 4 found a strong correlation between airflow from Intel when nearby residents reported strong chemical odors and resulting adverse health effects.

The last paragraph on page 5 quotes Mary Uhl, of NMED. They fail to say that Ms. Uhl earlier stated that the Koracin modeling study identified Intel as the most likely source of the toxic emissions.

Ms. Uhl and Ms. Len Flowers of the NM Dept. of Health had scheduled presentations in support of the Koracin report findings at the next Task Force meeting. To prevent those presentations, Environment Secretary Ron Curry canceled all Task Force meetings for the next six weeks, and then prevented the Task Force from writing their final report by having NMED write it, to ensure the exoneration of Intel.

Ms. Uhl was soon thereafter promoted to Section Chief, perhaps in exchange for her belated silence.

The FTIR monitoring by Arcadis is cited on page 7. Not mentioned is that Intel was a pre-existing customer of Arcadis services, and that Arcadis had listed increased business from Intel as one of its major goals for 2003. This blatant conflict of interest resulted in Arcadis declaring phosgene and nine other measured Intel-released chemicals as false positives.

The second new paragraph on page 7 states "the large majority of chemicals detected in highest concentrations are those associated with vehicle emissions."
That may have been true during the day, but the large majority of chemicals found after midnight, when vehicle traffic is lowest, are Intel emissions. Moreover, the highest concentrations of these post-midnight chemicals were found at Intel's east boundary, closest to residential areas, and furthest from Highway 528.

The Intel weather station cited in the first new paragraph on page 8 does not reflect the airflow distortions caused by Intel buildings, nor does it account for the downwash caused by Intel buildings.

This same paragraph again focuses on daytime vehicle emissions, whereas most resident complaints are reported for the post-midnight hours.

The modeling discussion on page 9 again tries to confuse us by focusing on daytime sources, whereas the strong chemical odors and adverse health effects of nearby residents occur when other possible sources are minimal.

As discussed in one of the public comments sent earlier, Gradient's main business is defending industrial polluters. Gradient failed to interview even one resident who reported adverse health effects, but instead relied totally on input from Intel and NMED.

Intel's attempt to blame any and all other possible sources for their own toxic emissions is repeated on page 11. This ignores the strong correlation found by the Koracin modeling study. It also ignores the fact that strong chemical odors and related health problems were absent until Intel greatly expanded its operations in the early 1990s.

On page 12, Intel claims to spend $500,000 a year to validate the effectiveness of its emission controls. This is another attempt to mislead ATSDR and the public, because Intel reports only calculated values (even when their infrequent measurements show much higher release).

As long as only calculated values are reported, no one - including Intel - knows what they actually release. The cited $500,00 should be chalked up as another image-building expense.

In the first new paragraph on page 13, Intel opposes more monitoring. That is not surprising because Intel consistently opposed any and all monitoring until Corrales residents donated $93,000 to buy its own community owned and operated FTIR. Only then did Intel change course and "allow" NMED to begin monitoring. Interestingly, NMED's opposition to monitoring closely followed Intel's change.

If Intel were as innocent as they claim, they would welcome any and all monitoring that would confirm their innocence. However, their past and present opposition is more likely an effort to prevent self-incrimination.

Intel's conclusion on pages 13 and 14 ignores the hundreds of complaints reported by Intel's nearby residents. It is worth noting that hundreds of these complaints were "lost" by NMED during a computer changeover.

Hmmmmm!

Fred Marsh, CRCAW

Poison Gas Concerns

CORRALES COMMENT VOL.XXVIII, No. 3 March 21, 2009

Federal Toxics Agency Reviews Poison Gas Concerns Over Intel’s Waste Chemical Emissions

By Jeff Radford

Fourth in a series

The deadly chemical warfare gas phosgene is not being released into the air as a byproduct of Intel’s microchip manufacturing, say federal investigators for the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR).

Their finding is based on Intel’s assertion that the waste acid gases that could form phosgene are isolated in the factories’ exhaust streams.

Even so, Intel has insisted on being allowed to discharge to the open air over Corrales 5.3 tons of phosgene as part of its State-issued air pollution permit. That is, Intel officials say they neither use nor release phosgene in any manufacturing process, but in case it was somehow formed and released, Intel would still comply with its permit as long as the amount was under 5.3 tons in a year’s time.

But retired Los Alamos National Laboratories chemist Fred Marsh has contended for years that Intel does release phosgene, despite its denials. He says he has seen phosgene’s chemical signature in the spectrographs produced at a Corrales home downwind from Intel…and so have analysts studying results of other Fourier transform infrared spectrometers (FTIRs) positioned around Intel.

“Although Intel has always denied using phosgene, their permit addresses what is released, not what is used,” Marsh said after reviewing the community health consultation draft report issued last month.

“And the ATSDR report confirms that phosgene is readily formed in the Intel exhaust from carbon tetrachloride that Intel has used and released in multi-ton quantities, as we have been saying for many years.

“Because Intel claims that they neither use nor release phosgene, I have repeatedly asked Intel representatives to delete the 5.3 tons of phosgene their permit allows them to release,” Marsh noted. “But they have always insisted on keeping their ‘right’ to release a quantity of phosgene that could kill tens of thousands of people.”

A leader of Corrales Residents for Clean Air and Water (CRCAW) until he moved out of state a few years ago, Marsh was an active participant in the earlier Corrales Air Toxics Study funded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and administered by the Air Quality Bureau of the N.M. Environment Department (NMED).

His expertise was key to selection of the FTIR purchased with community donations in 2003. The device detects and displays chemicals that modify the spectrum of a reflected infrared light beam.

Two other FTIRs were operating at the same time when air monitoring was conducted for the 2002-04 Corrales Air Toxic Study. One was on site under contract to the Air Quality Bureau; another was operated by an Intel consultant.

All three detected a chemical identified as phosgene, March recalled.

Although the voluminous data collected for the Air Toxics Study comprised much of the material ATSDR studied for its four-year health consultation, the agency discounted those detections of phosgene, apparently accepting Intel’s interpretation that the FTIR readings were “false positive.”

“ATSDR disregards the FTIR measurements made by [Intel consultant] TRC on Intel property that conclusively showed many toxic chemicals at orders of magnitude above safe levels,” March contends. “ATSDR also refused to look into the dismissal of phosgene and other toxic chemicals as ‘false positives’ even though they were found by all three FTIRs during the same period.”

This is how ATSDR addressed the phosgene issue verbatim in the recently released community health consultation. “Community Concern – Phosgene and False Positives. Four compounds detected by the open path FTIR, including nitric acid and phosgene, were determined to be ‘false positives’ by the N.M. Environment Department, yet phosgene was reported by Intel-New Mexico.

“ATSDR Response: Phosgene can be formed when chlorinated hydrocarbon compounds (e.g. chloroform) are exposed to high temperatures, such as what occurs in thermal oxidizers. Intel-New Mexico reports, however, that its exhaust ventilation system is designed to prevent corrosive chlorine-containing gases from being vented to the thermal oxidizers.

“Intel-New Mexico and NMED open path FTIR used different methods for analyzing their data. ATSDR did not attempt to re-evaluate false positive determinations made by NMED’s consultant-spectroscopists. ATSDR is recommending that Intel-New Mexico, in partnership with New Mexico, educate the public on the process controls and safety measures that prevent the formation of phosgene during Intel-New Mexico plant operations.”

That phrasing suggests that ATSDR accepts Intel’s assurance that phosgene cannot be produced. The ATSDR team does not recommend that further testing for phosgene be conducted, but rather that Intel officials should persuade nearby residents that the lethal gas can’t physically be released.

ATSDR tem member Debra Gable, an environmental health scientist, explained their position this way: “We’re saying if that information [that Intel is not releasing phosgene] is available, then it should be provided to the community.”

But Marsh says the ATSDR response on phosgene release apparently misunderstands how the chemical would be formed and routed to the air. “The carbon tetrachloride also reacts with water vapor at slightly elevated temperatures to form phosgene. And these are the conditions in the scrubbers through which carbon tetrachloride is released.

“I made a major fuss about Intel actually measuring 1.4 tons of carbon tetrachloride being released from just one of their many scrubbers in the fourth quarter of 2003. Yet they reported zero release, based on their phony emission factor.

“When I complained to Robert Samaniego [then Intel’s air permit compliance officer] about this emission factor obviously being too low, he agreed, but told me only Intel could initiate emission factor changes.”

Therefore, Marsh pointed out, ATSDR’s dismissal of possible phosgene releases “totally ignores the fact that there is an obvious and plausible mechanism by which phosgene can be formed in Intel scrubbers, and it ignores the fact that three different FTIRs using three different operators and three different software packages all found phosgene near Intel during the same period.”

“Moreover, phosgene was found hundreds of times by TRC, Intel’s own contractor, with the highest frequencies and levels found at Intel’s eastern boundary adjacent to Corrales residential areas.”

When pressed by Corrales Comment whether ATSDR itself had been convinced that phosgene is not being released, team leader Peter Kowalski replied, “They said the waste gas streams are kept separated; essentially keeping the chlorinated compounds out of the gas stream that’s designated for volatile organic compounds… non-chlorinated compounds. That’s what we based our opinion on.”

And as to the acceptability of declaring readings to be false positives, Kowalski said “It’s not our role to issue a second opinion on the appropriateness of false positives. But we do feel like the FTIR methodology has a kind of science and an art to it.”

At any rate, he said, “We would want an up-front methodology on how to deal with possible ‘false positives.’”

Corrales Comment pressed Kowalski for a definitive statement on whether his team is convinced phosgene can’t be released. He replied, “Based on information provided from Intel, yes, we believe there is no possibility that phosgene is being released.

“But we will look further into whether hexaflouroethane is released.”

Although Marsh had identified the compound hexaflouroethane as a likely cause of Corrales residents’ illnesses back in 2004, ATSDR’s study did not examine that in the draft report.

The chemical, often described as a “semiconductor gas,” has been detected and measured in the air at times when villagers living near Intel have reported industrial odors and sickness, Marsh pointed out.

Hexaflouroethane is a chemical precursor to hydrogen fluoride which Intel admits using and releasing. It is much heavier than air and therefore might be expected to sink to ground level after leaving the factories’ stacks.

It was, in fact, repeatedly detected at ground level by FTIRs around Intel during the Corrales Air Toxics Study 2002-04. It was found more often than any other industrial chemical, 36 times, by the community-purchased FTIR during the period September 13-29, 2003, Marsh recalled.

The chemist said health effects hexaflouroethane produces on humans are strikingly similar to complaints by Corrales residents over the past decade and a half: respiratory problems, headaches, nausea, throat, skin and eye irritations, coughing, dizziness, fatigue and loss of consciousness.

It is also odorless and invisible.

When he found hexaflouroethane’s signature in the spectrometer’s displays, Marsh thought he might have solved a big part of the mystery. He noted that the chemical reacts with water vapor (such as within the lungs or in the airborne water vapor pouring from Intel’s cooling towers and acid gas scrubbers) to form the toxic hydrogen fluoride and carbonyl fluoride.

“Because carbonyl fluoride is so similar to phosgene (carbonyl chloride) in structure and toxicity, it is also known as flourophosgene,” Marsh pointed out.

The retired chemist made that point to Intel’s corporate-level physician, Don Fisher, in November 2003. “We found tetraflouromethane and hexafluoroethane more often than any other compounds, and these were always present when people got sick,” he wrote. “Because the New Jersey Department of Health Hazardous Facts Sheets included a list of symptoms for hexaflouroethane that were nearly identical to those reported by some of Intel’s nearest neighbors, we felt we had identified the culprit.

“I stand behind my statement that hexaflouroethane can react with water to form hydrogen fluoride and carbonyl fluoride (also known as flourophosgene). The fact that carbonyl fluoride was found by neither FTIR [operated by the Air Quality Bureau and by Intel] is not surprising, as neither instrument has this compound in its reference library.”

In a presentation Marsh made to the NMED-assembled task force for the Corrales Air Toxics Study, he noted that “Dr. Don Fisher, a physician on Intel’s payroll, claims that carbonyl fluoride cannot be formed or exist long enough to be measured. Yet as a scientist, I am swayed by experimental evidence to the contrary. Intel’s own third quarter report for 2003 includes TRC stack testing data in which carbonyl fluoride was measured on Scrubber 8s.4.2ab at 2,280 parts per billion, and again later at the same scrubber at more than 1,600 parts per billion.

“This is the same Central Utility Building scrubber that is closest to Corrales residential area, whose malfunctions (according to Intel whistle-blowers) have been the source of many of the toxic pollutants that reach Corrales.”

Marsh’s paper for the task force then referenced a published article, “Using a Catalytic Technique to Abate PFC Emissions in a 300-mm Etch Tool,” which he said “provides additional proof that carbonyl fluoride is formed in semiconductor manufacturing processes.

“In fact, that article discusses how the toxic carbonyl fluoride byproduct of the semiconductor manufacturing process can be removed by a pre-treatment scrubber.”

Marsh took Intel to task for denying it releases such toxins. “Intel continues to deny that it is the source of the phosgene that was found hundreds of times by its own contractor on Intel property and in nearby neighborhoods. Yet there can be no question that Intel releases flourophosgene, which is as toxic as phosgene or perhaps even worse, as its production is accompanied by hydrogen fluoride.

“Moreover, published symptoms of exposure to flourophosgene are identical to those reported in the [CRCAW-distributed] Corrales Health Survey by hundreds of residents who live near Intel,” Marsh reported in his 2004 presentation.

“So whether it’s phosgene or flourophosgene, there can be no doubt that Intel is the source of the toxic compounds” which he thinks have caused Corrales residents’ illnesses.

After reviewing the ATSDR draft report last month, Marsh reflected on the situation in which Corrales residents find themselves. “A terrible mistake was made when Intel was allowed to build one of the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturing plants within several hundred yards of existing residential areas.

“That mistake was compounded when NMED was given the political mission of protecting Intel as its client, even at the expense of public health and the environment. NMED’s approval of Intel’s ‘minor source’ permit, and its automatic granting of any and all permit changes requested by Intel, led us to seek ATSDR’s help,” Marsh observed.

“Although we’re pleased with many of ATSDR’s initial findings, we hope our input to their draft report will help them to identify Intel as a source of our pollution problem, and then persuade NMED and Intel to work with us to restore the clean air we enjoyed before Intel’s arrival.”